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Die Rolle von Unternehmen in Räumen 
umstrittener Staatlichkeit
von Eberhard Sandschneider
Zusammenfassung
•	 Funktionierende	Staatlichkeit	ist	eher	die	Ausnahme	als	die	Regel	in	der	Staatenwelt	
des	frühen	21.	Jahrhunderts.	Schwache	und	zerfallende	Staaten	sowie	völkerrechtlich	
umstrittene	Gebiete	gehören	infolgedessen	zu	den	größten	Herausforderungen	in	
der	internationalen	Politik	in	allen	Fragen	des	wirtschaftlichen	Aufbaus,	aber	auch	der	
globalen	Sicherheit.	Die	vergessene	Dimension	dieser	Diskussion	berührt	die	Frage,	
welche	Rolle	unternehmerische	Aktivitäten	in	diesem	Kontext	spielen.
•	 Bei	völkerrechtlich	umstrittenen	Regionen	handelt	es	sich	um	Gebiete,	in	denen	
Staatlichkeit	nicht	eindeutig	definiert	ist,	weil	mindestens	zwei	Souveränitätsansprüche	
erhoben	werden	und	eine	umfassende	internationale	Anerkennung	folglich	unter-
bleibt.	Als	unmittelbare	Folge	zeigen	solche	Regionen	immer	in	unterschiedlicher	
Weise	Formen	von	Staatsversagen	und	begrenzter	Staatlichkeit,	die	insbesondere	für	
wirtschaftliche	Akteure	mit	erheblichen	Risiken	verbunden	sind.
•	 Unternehmen	erweisen	sich	in	solchen	Regionen	als	entscheidende	Akteure,	um	
wenigstens	ein	Mindestmaß	an	Stabilität	im	Sinne	der	Versorgung	der	Bevölkerung	
mit	Basisdienstleistungen	etwa	in	den	Bereichen	Infrastruktur,	Telekommunikation,	
Bankwesen	und	Logistik	zu	gewährleisten.	Diese	Stabilisierungsfunktion	ist	die	
Voraussetzung	für	jeden	weiterführenden	Versuch	der	externen	Beeinflussung	
und	Unterstützung	von	Staatsbildung	oder	gar	Transformation	zur	Demokratie.	
Natürlich	gilt	dies	nur	für	die	Unternehmen,	die	sich	der	politischen	Konsequenzen	
ihres	Handelns	bewusst	sind	und	sich	an	die	entsprechend	geltenden	globalen	
Gepflogenheiten	und	Standards	(etwa	den	„global	compact“)	halten.
•	 Für	Unternehmen	in	solchen	Regionen	ist	Erfolg	in	wirtschaftlich	und	politisch	
schwierigen	Rahmenbedingungen	daran	gebunden,	dass	so	lange	wie	möglich	
Politikferne	praktiziert	werden	kann,	eigene	Sozialstandards	konsequent	und	transpa-
rent	umgesetzt	werden,	Unterstützung	nicht	nur	im	lokalen,	sondern	auch	im	regio-
nalen	und	globalen	Rahmen	(insbesondere	in	Fragen	der	fehlenden	Rechtssicherheit)	
gesucht	wird,	die	Kooperation	mit	anderen	Unternehmen	zur	erfolgreichen	
Interessendurchsetzung	vor	Ort	genutzt	wird	und	schließlich	ein	proaktives	
Kommunikationskonzept	zur	Anwendung	kommt,	das	rechtzeitig	vor	ungerechtfer-
tigter	Kritik	zu	schützen	vermag.
•	 Um	die	stabilisierenden	Effekte	von	Unternehmensaktivitäten	zu	nutzen	ist	die	inter-
nationale	Staatengemeinschaft	gut	beraten,	wo	immer	möglich,	die	Voraussetzungen	
für	größere	Rechtssicherheit	(etwa	bei	Fragen	der	Strafverfolgung	unter	konkur-
rierenden	Rechtssystemen)	zu	schaffen.	Erst	aus	dem	kooperativen	Zusammenwirken	
zwischen	staatlichen	Förderaktivitäten,	zivilgesellschaftlichem	Engagement	und	unter-
nehmerischer	Stabilisierungshilfe	werden	die	Voraussetzungen	für	eine	erfolgreiche	
Politik	der	Unterstützung	schwacher	und	zerfallender	Staaten	von	außen	geschaffen.
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Doing Business in Disputed Regions
by Eberhard Sandschneider
•	 Weak	states	and	disputed	regions	have	become	one	of 	the	predominant	chal-
lenges	for	efficient	and	peaceful	cooperation	in	the	early	21st	century.	Business	
activities	are	the	forgotten	dimension	of 	the	debate	on	sustainable	state	building	
efforts.
•	 Disputed	regions	may,	therefore,	be	defined	as	areas	where	statehood	and	inter-
national	legal	recognition	are	contested	and	where,	as	a	consequence,	different	
forms	of 	failing	statehood	prevail.	Not	all	disputed	regions	are	failing	or	failed	
states	in	a	strictly	political	sense,	but	there	is	a	high	likelihood	that	disputed	regi-
ons	become	failed	or	that	failing	states	turn	into	disputed	regions.
•	 The	relative	neglect	of 	business	activities	is	also	a	major	reason	for	failing	att-
empts	of 	creating	the	most	basic	and	necessary	requisite	of 	state	building:	A	
minimum	and	reliable	setting	of 	livelihood,	economic	performance	and	social	
cohesion	are	a	crucial	necessity	for	stability.
•	 Business	activities	are	key	to	success	in	stabilizing	disputed	regions	and	failing	
states:	For	millions	of 	people,	basic	services	helping	them	to	organize	their	most	
urgent	daily	needs	are	not	being	provided	for	by	functioning	states	and	state	ser-
vices	but	by	private	companies	both	domestic	and	international.	Without	such	
business	activities	aimed	at	improving	infrastructure,	providing	communication	
services,	organizing	basic	logistic	needs	or	allowing	for	financial	transactions,	life	
in	these	regions	would	be	even	more	complicated	because	states	or	competing	
state-like	institutions	are	not	able	or	willing	to	provide	these	services.
•	 The	biggest	challenges	encountered	by	external	actors	in	failing	or	failed	states	
are	a	lack	of 	legal	reliability,	uncertain	and	in	some	cases	high	risk	security	
circumstances,	dangers	of 	misuse	of 	products,	problems	with	the	transfer	of 	
corporate	governance	and	in	most	cases	threats	to	a	company’s	corporate	image	
including	the	danger	of 	financial	losses	on	third	(and	usually	more	important)	
markets.
•	 Successful	business	strategies	in	disputed	regions	should	concentrate	on	avoiding	
direct	political	involvement	(as	long	as	and	whenever	possible),	on	implementing	
a	transparent	code	of 	conduct	and	standards	of 	business	behaviour,	on	seeking	
support	not	only	from	local,	but	also	from	regional	institutions	and	international	
regulatory	systems,	and	finally,	on	choosing	a	pro-active	communication	strategy	
in	order	to	protect	business	activities	from	politically	motivated	criticism.
•	 For	international	actors	and	states	it	is	of 	paramount	importance	to	understand	
the	need	to	support	business	activities	–	both	politically	and	legally	in	order	to	
provide	at	least	a	minimum	of 	protection	for	agents	on	the	ground.
Summary
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Failing States, Disputed Regions 
and the Role of Business
The	role	of 	business	activities	in	failing	states	or	dis-
puted	regions	hitherto	has	found	little	academic	and	
political	attention.1	In	most	public	debates	about	how	
best	to	promote	state	building,	the	role	of 	business	
is	a	dark	spot.	This	research	paper	tries	to	refocus	
the	debate	on	state	building	by	addressing	this	sensi-
tive	issue	with	a	clear	message:	Business	activities	are	
instrumental	to	any	attempt	of 	successfully	promot-
ing	stability	and	state	building	in	some	of 	the	most	
sensitive	regions	of 	today’s	global	landscape.	It	is,	
therefore,	utterly	necessary	to	focus	more	on	business	
activities	in	disputed	regions	as	a	requisite	and	major	
strategic	approach	to	success	in	building	stability,	sup-
porting	people’s	livelihood	in	afflicted	areas	and	pur-
sue	a	sustainable	perspective	of 	political	development	
towards	functioning	statehood	(and	in	a	long-term	
perspective	even	democracy).
Debates	about	the	respective	role	of 	states	as	major	
actors	in	global	affairs	have	a	long	tradition	in	media,	
politics	and	academia.	Over	the	last	years,	assump-
tions	that	states	may	relatively	loose	their	importance	
due	to	effects	of 	globalization	and	the	rise	both	
of 	NGOs	and	global	business	have	been	replaced	
by	an	assumed	“return	of 	the	state”.2	While	these	
debates	have	mainly	dominated	academic	discus-
sions,	a	closer	look	at	the	reality	of 	state	power	at	the	
beginning	21st	century	shows	a	sobering	perspec-
tive:	The	world	of 	today	is	dominated	by	some	190	
odd	states	or	state-like	regions.	But	statehood	in	the	
sense	that	political	and	economic	actors	find	reliable	
and	sustainable	institutional	frameworks	and	legal	
rules	for	their	respective	activities	are	the	exception,	
not	the	rule.	The	assumption	that	statehood	always	
works	more	or	less	automatically	in	established	and	
internationally	recognized	states	is	a	myth.	In	many	
cases,	statehood	is	in	one	way	or	another	limited	to	
the	extent	that	we	even	find	failing	or	outright	failed	
state	structures.	This	phenomenon	becomes	even	
more	important	when	we	turn	to	disputed	regions	
(see	below).
However,	government	structures	developed	in	coun-
tries	with	limited	statehood	differ	from	those	in	estab-
lished	western	states.	A	comparative	research	done	by	
the	German	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	(DGAP)	
and	published	as	2010	Yearbook	clearly	shows	that	it	
is	important	to	view	good	governance	not	in	a	nor-
mative,	but	in	a	functional	sense	including	the	difficul-
ties	encountered	by	state	builders	who	try	to	establish	
new	rules	and	institutions	in	regions	of 	limited,	fail-
ing	or	disputed	statehood.	In	conclusion,	state	actors	
(and	public	comments)	should	abstain	from	simply	
projecting	western	ideas	of 	democracies	on	precari-
ous	states	and	certainly	from	attempting	to	fast	track	
the	transformation	of 	existing	local	power	structures.3
It	is	furthermore	important	to	realize	that	all	attempts	
(mainly	by	western	democracies)	to	support	state	
building	in	weak	and	frail	states	have	produced	lim-
ited,	if 	any	results	at	all.	The	preoccupation	with	
state	building	instead	of 	stability	building	has	led	to	
high	expectations	both	among	donors	and	recipi-
ents.	But	an	undisputable	lack	of 	positive	results	has	
meanwhile	replaced	the	hopes	of 	the	early	1990s.	A	
sobering	disappointment	seems	to	characterize	recent	
debates	about	aims	and	limits	to	external	support	for	
state	building.	Most	obviously,	in	cases	like	Afghani-
stan	or	Iraq	these	attempts	have	failed	and	keep	fail-
ing	for	two	reasons:	First,	the	simple	approach	of 	
transferring	benchmarks	of 	western	statehood	includ-
ing	institutions,	rules	and	values	into	areas	without	
social,	political	and	economic	stability	is	bound	to	fail-
ure.	Second,	the	relative	neglect	of 	business	activities	
is	a	major	reason	for	failing	attempts	of 	building	the	
most	basic	and	necessary	requisite	of 	state	building:	
stability,	i.e.	a	minimum	and	reliable	setting	of 	liveli-
hood,	economic	performance	and	social	cohesion.
Doing Business in Disputed Regions
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As	a	consequence,	weak	states	and	disputed	regions	
have	become	one	of 	the	predominant	challenges	for	
efficient	and	peaceful	cooperation	in	the	early	21st	
century.	Depending	on	the	criteria,	indicators	and	
data	used	to	measure	statehood,	some	40	–	60	states	
may	at	present	be	measured	as	“weak”,	“failing”	or	
“failed”.	Among	them	are	countries	as	different	as	
Bosnia-Herzegovina,	Georgia,	Afghanistan,	Pakistan,	
Iraq,	Lebanon,	Yemen,	Somalia	or	the	Democratic	
Republic	of 	Congo.	
Disputed Regions: A Comparative 
Perspective
There	are	good	reasons	to	focus	international	atten-
tion	on	these	regions	–	for	normative	aspects	since	
they	do	not	fulfil	legitimate	standards,	but	also	for	
security	reasons	since	they	may	have	a	negative	impact	
on	their	own	territory,	but	similarly	important	also	
on	their	neighbouring	countries	and	beyond.	When	
Chancellor	Merkel	became	target	of 	a	bomb	parcel	in	
November	2010,	it	soon	became	clear	that	the	threat	
came	from	Yemen	via	Greece,	was	transported	via	
cargo	flights	and	delivered	logistically	without	any	sus-
picion.	The	danger	emanating	from	failing	states	and	
disputed	regions	once	more	became	obvious.
A	special	case	of 	weak	statehood	concerns	disputed	
regions	where	political	rules	are	not	defined	by	one	
central	authority,	but	where	political	power	is	con-
tested	between	two	or	more	political	stakeholders,	
sometimes	even	with	the	involvement	of 	the	inter-
national	community.	Disputed	regions	may,	therefore,	
be	defined	as	areas	where	statehood	and	international	
legal	recognition	is	contested,	where	basic	state	func-
tions	are	limited	or	even	non-existing	and	where	–	as	
a	consequence	–	economic	recovery	remains	close	to	
or	even	below	zero.	
In	most	cases,	disputed	regions	are	not	only	areas	of 	
contested	statehood,	but	also	a	sub-category	of 	failing	
or	failed	states	with	“weak	capacities	to	carry	out	basic	
functions	of 	governing	a	population	and	its	territory”	
and	“lack	the	ability	to	develop	mutually	constructive	
and	reinforcing	relations	with	society.”4	Contested	
statehood	in	all	cases	included	here	leads	to	deficien-
cies	in	state	functions	and	institutional	performance	
which	are	a	core	aspect	for	ranking	a	certain	region	as	
being	disputed.5
Before	we	briefly	look	at	nine	of 	the	most	prominent	
cases	of 	disputed	regions,	it	should	be	clear	that	this	
project	is	not	taking	positions	as	to	which	claims	
between	contenders	for	statehood	and	sovereignty	
should	be	regarded	as	legitimate	or	more	legitimate	
than	others.	The	case	selection	is	simply	based	on	the	
fact	that	in	the	regions	mentioned	below	statehood	is	
disputed	for	whatever	reason	with	a	focus	on	the	con-
sequences	for	business	activities.
It	is	furthermore	important	to	note	that	when	deal-
ing	with	disputed	regions	access	to	reliable	facts	and	
sources	about	the	situation	on	the	ground	is	not	
always	available.	This	is	not	only	a	challenge	for	exter-
nal	observers	and	research	on	the	regions,	but	also	
a	major	challenge	for	any	company	in	need	of 	basic	
information	on	political	and	economic	backgrounds	
before	deciding	on	potential	investment.
The	nine	cases	on	which	the	logic	of 	this	proposal	is	
based	can	be	briefly	characterized	as	follows	(in	alpha-
betical	order):
Abkhazia
The	region	of 	Abkhazia	is	located	close	to	the	Black	
Sea	and	de	jure	a	part	of 	Georgia	with	a	population	
of 	about	200,000	inhabitants.	Following	the	collapse	
of 	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	independence	of 	Geor-
gia	in	1991,	Abkhazia	proclaimed	independence	the	
following	year.	After	some	military	impacts,	causing	
thousands	of 	deaths	and	about	250,000	ethnic	Geor-
gian	refugees,	today	only	Russia,	Nicaragua,	Venezuela	
and	Nauru	recognise	Abkhazia’s	independence,	while	
Georgia,	the	USA	and	NATO	consider	Abkhazia	as	
Georgian	territory	occupied	by	Russia	–	1,500	Russian	
soldiers	are	positioned	in	the	region	guaranteeing	free-
dom	on	behalf 	of 	the	Commonwealth	of 	Indepen-
dent	States.	Contrary	to	the	second	disputed	Georgian	
region,	South	Ossetia,	Abkhazia	is	less	dependent	on	
Russia	concerning	budgetary	and	state	structures.
Russian	investors	are	actively	trying	to	develop	the	
region	through	investment	focusing	on	the	tourism	
branch	and	infrastructure,	especially	in	the	light	of 	
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the	upcoming	2014	Olympic	Winter	Games	in	Sochi,	
Russia.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Nagorno-Karabakh	is	located	in	the	southwest	of 	
Azerbaijan,	close	to	the	Armenian	and	Iranian	bor-
der.	Together	with	the	areas	around	Nagorno-Kara-
bakh,	which	are	likewise	occupied	by	the	Armenian	
army,	the	region	amounts	to	about	one	fifth	of 	the	
Azerbaijan	territory	and	has	approximately	140,000	
inhabitants.
De	jure	the	region	is	part	of 	Azerbaijan,	but	today	
it	is	largely	occupied	by	ethnic	Armenians,	who	pro-
claimed	independence	in	1991.	Between	1988	and	a	
ceasefire	in	1994	there	were	many	serious,	bloody	acts	
of 	war	between	Armenian	and	Azerbaijanian	troops,	
which	caused	thousands	of 	deaths	on	both	sides	and	
were	eventually	won	by	the	Armenian	side.	Since	then,	
there	have	been	several	attempts	to	resolve	the	con-
flict	–	attended	by	ongoing	armed	fights.	In	this	con-
text	the	most	important	board	is	the	so-called	Minsk	
Group,	initiated	by	the	OSCE	in	1992	–	although	
without	real	success	till	today.
Because	of 	the	disputed	status	of 	Nagorno-Karabakh	
and	its	dependence	on	Armenia,	whose	economy	
is	not	very	strong	itself,	its	economic	position	is	
problematic.	The	fact	of 	being	a	de	facto	Armenian	
exclave	in	Azerbaijan	causes	severe	infrastructure	and	
transportation	problems.
Kosovo
Kosovo	has	about	1.8	million	inhabitants.	It	is	located	
south	of 	Serbia,	east	of 	Montenegro,	and	north	
of 	Albania	and	Macedonia.	In	February	2008,	the	
Parliament	of 	Kosovo	declared	political	indepen-
dence	from	the	former	Serbian	province	and	thus	
rendered	Kosovo	a	clear	case	of 	disputed	statehood.	
Until	August	2010,	only	69	out	of 	the	192	members	
of 	the	United	Nations	recognized	Kosovo	as	an	
independent	state.		Undoubtedly,	ethnical	violence	
has	been	considerably	reduced	in	the	region,	but	
discrimination	of 	minorities,	problems	with	refugees	
and	tensions,	sometimes	even	confrontations	between	
Kosovars	and	the	roundabout	100,000	Serbs	who	still	
live	in	Kosovo	still	occur.	In	conclusion,	sovereignty	
in	Kosovo	is	contested	which	means	that	there	is	
no	central	government	control	over	the	northern	
territory.
Kosovo’s	economic	performance	has	improved	
considerably	over	the	past	decade,	but	large	imbal-
ances	persist.	The	external	imbalances	largely	reflect	
infrastructure	bottlenecks,	especially	in	the	transport	
system	and	energy	sector,	that	continue	to	stifle	the	
export	sector	and	output	growth.	The	economy	is	
import-oriented	and	dependent	on	external	remit-
tances.	The	GDP	growth	was	4	percent	in	2009	and	
the	inflation	average	was	2.2	percent	p.a.	over	the	past	
five	years.	Between	2001	and	2006	FDI	more	than	
trebled.
Northern Cyprus
The	island	Cyprus	is	located	in	the	very	east	of 	the	
Mediterranean	Sea,	south	of 	Turkey	and	west	of 	Syria	
and	Lebanon.	The	whole	island	has	a	population	of 	
about	1.05	million,	with	about	780,000	inhabitants	liv-
ing	in	the	southern	part.
Since	1983,	Cyprus	is	de	facto	divided	into	two	parts	
–	a	Turkish	oriented	northern	part	and	a	Greek	ori-
ented	southern	part.	Already	after	becoming	a	British	
colony	in	1925	and	later	after	becoming	independent	
in	1959	the	split	between	these	two	ethnic	groups	
became	visible.	In	the	following	years	the	conflict	
built	up	to	the	separation	of 	the	two	regions	through	
the	so-called	“Green	Line”,	which	divides	the	capital	
Nicosia	and	the	whole	island.	Turkey,	whose	troops	
invaded	the	northern	part	of 	the	island	in	1974,	is	the	
only	country	worldwide	which	recognizes	the	Turkish	
Republic	of 	Northern	Cyprus	(TRNC),	which	was	
proclaimed	in	1983.	In	the	past,	the	UN	has	made	
several	attempts	at	resolving	the	conflict	but	there	
seems	to	be	no	clear	perspective	for	conflict	resolu-
tion	in	the	foreseeable	future.
Due	to	different	reasons	the	economic	development	
in	the	northern	part	of 	Cyprus	has	been	weaker	than	
that	in	the	south.	The	unemployment	rate	in	2010	is	
close	to	24	percent	in	the	north	and	about	7	percent	
in	the	south.	One	of 	the	main	problems	is	the	trade	
between	the	TRNC	and	the	member	states	of 	the	
EU,	which	is	negatively	influenced	by	the	southern	
part	and	its	bureaucracy.	For	Turkey	a	change	of 	this	
DGAPanalyse 4 | December 2010
8
situation	is	a	precondition	for	a	stronger	relationship	
with	the	southern	part	in	economic	and	traffic	related	
terms.
South Ossetia
South	Ossetia	is	a	very	small	region	of 	about	3,900	
km²	in	the	north	of 	Georgia	with	approximately	
70,000	inhabitants	which	are	mostly	ethnic	Ossetians.	
It	was	the	main	location	of 	the	fights	between	Geor-
gian	and	Russian	troops	in	the	war	of 	August	2008.	
South	Ossetia	is	still	occupied	by	about	1,700	Russian	
soldiers	and	recognized	as	independent	only	by	Rus-
sia,	Nicaragua,	Venezuela	and	Nauru.	Russia	staffs	
over	half 	of 	the	government,	donates	98	percent	
of 	the	budget	and	provides	at	least	minimal	security.	
The	Ossetians	were	divided	in	early	Soviet	times	in	a	
northern	part,	which	is	now	part	of 	the	Russian	Fed-
eration	and	a	southern	part,	which	belongs	to	Georgia.	
Since	its	traditional	trading	routes	to	the	rest	of 	Geor-
gia	are	closed,	the	underdeveloped	South	Ossetian	
economy	has	been	more	or	less	reduced	to	a	service	
provider	for	Russian	military	and	construction	per-
sonnel.	As	an	outcome	of 	the	Russian-Georgian	war	
the	regional	infrastructure	was	destroyed	to	a	great	
extent	and	reconstruction	is	proceeding	slowly.	As	a	
consequence,	the	region	shows	a	low	level	of 	income	
and	a	high	unemployment	rate.	
Somaliland
Somaliland	is	located	in	the	east	of 	Africa,	in	the	
north	of 	Somalia,	east	of 	Ethiopia,	south	of 	Djibouti,	
bordering	the	Gulf 	of 	Aden	in	the	north.	The	popu-
lation	presumably	amounts	to	about	2.5	–	3.5	million.
After	the	independence	from	Great	Britain	in	1960,	
today´s	Somaliland	and	former	colony	British-Somalil-
and	united	with	Italian-Somaliland	to	the	Republic	of 	
Somalia.	In	the	context	of 	the	civil	war	in	the	coun-
try,	the	region	of 	Somaliland	unilaterally	proclaimed	
independence	from	the	Republic	of 	Somalia.	Because	
of 	internal	instability,	e.g.	continuous	conflicts	over	
territorial	affiliation	concerning	bordering	areas,	there	
is	no	widespread	recognition	of 	the	region’s	indepen-
dence	and	additionally	Somaliland	is	–	in	spite	of 	a	
membership	application	in	2005	–	not	a	member	of 	
the	African	Union.
Although	the	economy	has	grown	significantly	since	
the	proclamation	of 	independence,	it	is	still	a	vastly	
underdeveloped	region.	Poverty	and	hunger	are	wide-
spread	among	the	population.	The	most	important	
sources	of 	income	are	agriculture,	port	industry	and	
remittances	of 	compatriots	living	abroad.
Transnistria
With	about	3,600	km²	the	region	of 	Transnistria	
amounts	to	10	percent	of 	the	territory	of 	the	Repub-
lic	of 	Moldova.	One	third	of 	the	550,000	inhabitants,	
which	is	about	the	seventh	part	of 	the	Republic	of 	
Moldova,	are	ethnically	Moldavians,	one	third	Rus-
sians	and	one	third	Ukrainians.
Transnistria	is	strongly	oriented	towards	Russia	
–	about	500	Russian	soldiers	are	currently	positioned	
in	the	region	–,	although	under	international	law	it	
is	an	integral	part	of 	the	Republic	of 	Moldova.	To	
resolve	the	conflict,	negotiations	between	Transnistria,	
the	Republic	of 	Moldova,	Russia,	Ukraine	and	OSCE	
started	in	1993.	In	2005	this	group	was	expanded	to	
the	so-called	5+2-format	through	the	observer	status	
of 	the	EU	and	the	USA.	Currently	proceedings	are	
stagnating.
Traditionally	Transnistria	is	the	industrially	most	devel-
oped	area	in	Moldova.	Furthermore	the	trade	flows	
between	Transnistria	and	the	rest	of 	Moldova	are	
quite	significant.	The	import	rates	of 	Transnistria	are	
twice	as	high	as	the	export	rates.	Especially	in	the	face	
of 	the	global	financial	and	economic	crisis,	foreign	
direct	investment	(FDI)	became	essential.	In	the	first	
quarter	of 	2009	the	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	
decreased	about	9	percent	and	the	industrial	produc-
tion	about	30	percent.	For	2011	the	forecasts	for	the	
inflation	rate	are	amounting	to	12	percent.	Addition-
ally	Russia	cut	back	the	financial	support	in	2010	
connected	to	high	liabilities	towards	the	Russian	gas	
provider	Gazprom.
West Bank
The	West	Bank	shares	a	border	with	Israel	in	the	
north,	west	and	south,	while	in	the	east	it	borders	Jor-
dan.	The	population	amounts	to	2.35	million	people.	
Together	with	the	Gaza	Strip	it	forms	the	Palestinian	
Territories.
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After	the	Jordanian	occupation	and	annexation	violat-
ing	international	law	in	1948/1949	it	became	occupied	
by	Israel	in	1967.	Since	1993	parts	of 	the	area	have	
been	under	the	administration	of 	the	Palestinian	
National	Authority.
Compared	to	the	Gaza	Strip	the	economic	situation	in	
West	Bank	developed	quite	well	during	the	last	years.	
The	IWF	forecasts	an	8	percent	growth	rate	for	2010.	
The	biggest	competitive	advantages	are	the	high	qual-
ity	of 	education,	the	improved	security	situation	and	a	
successful	battle	against	corruption.	FDI	is	especially	
coming	from	the	Gulf 	States.
Western Sahara
The	region	is	located	in	the	African	northwest,	bor-
dering	the	Atlantic	Ocean	in	the	west,	Morocco	in	the	
north,	Algeria	in	the	west	and	Mauritania	in	the	west	
and	south.	The	population	amounts	to	about	380,000	
people.
After	the	former	colonial	power	Spain	had	left	the	ter-
ritory	in	1975,	Morocco	and	Mauritania	enforced	their	
claims	on	the	area.	In	1976,	after	350,000	Moroccans	
had	invaded	the	territory	of 	Western	Sahara	the	year	
before,	a	socialist	movement	called	Frente	Polisario,	
which	was	supported	by	Algeria,	claimed	the	indepen-
dent	state	of 	the	Democratic	Arabic	Republic	Sahara.	
Today	it	is	a	member	of 	the	African	Union	–	but	only	
19	out	of 	53	member	states	recognise	Western	Sahara	
as	independent,	while	due	to	this	conflict	Morocco	
is	the	only	African	state	not	included	in	the	alliance.	
After	Mauritania	backed	out	from	the	region	in	1979,	
Morocco	annexed	the	western	part	of 	Western	Sahara.	
After	the	ceasefire	of 	Frente	Polisario	and	Morocco,	
there	is	currently	no	final	decision	concerning	the	sta-
tus	of 	the	region.	About	100,000	refugees,	supporters	
of 	the	Frente	Polisario,	are	living	in	Algeria.
In	economic	and	infrastructural	terms	Western	Sahara	
is	still	very	underdeveloped,	especially	the	eastern	
part	which	is	not	under	Moroccan	control.	The	most	
important	sources	of 	economy	are	fishery,	date	palms	
and	mineral	resources,	especially	phosphate.	A	signifi-
cant	potential	is	accredited	to	the	branches	of 	wind	
energy	and	tourism.
Even	a	short	survey	of 	the	nine	regions	characterized	
so	far	as	falling	into	the	spectrum	of 	our	definition	
clearly	provides	three	consequences:
1.	 In	all	cases	on	which	this	study	is	based,	political	
tensions	lead	to	serious	negative	effects	on	local	
business,	trade,	people’s	livelihood,	social	stability	
and	security.	Global	business	partners	often	pro-
vide	at	least	a	minimum	of 	sensitive	products	(e.g.	
medicine)	and	scarce	services.	Although	acting	
under	circumstances	of 	maximum	risk,	their	con-
tribution	to	stabilization	is	without	alternative.
2.	 Neither	of 	these	cases	can	be	easily	compared	to	
any	other.	For	historical,	geographic,	political	and	
economic	reasons	each	region	has	in	the	end	to	
be	treated	as	sui	generis.	Highly	specific	historical,	
political	and	regional	settings,	tensions	between	
independence	(e.g.	Kosovo)	and	accession	(e.g.	
South	Ossetia	and	Transnistria)	and	different	levels	
and	problems	of 	economic	development,	legal	
conditions	and	dysfunctionalities	encountered	
hardly	allow	for	a	direct	comparison.6	As	a	conse-
quence,	searching	for	an	overall	approach	to	sup-
port	from	abroad	is	a	futile	expectation.	Instead,	
individual	and	step-by-step	approaches	are	the	
only	fruitful	basis	for	successful	business	strategies.	
There	is	no	grand	strategy	for	doing	business	in	
disputed	regions.
3.	 A	comparative	perspective	does,	however,	reveal	
the	systemic	problems	which	will	have	to	be	mas-
tered	by	external	actors,	no	matter	whether	they	
are	business	or	policy	oriented.	In	many	disputed	
regions,	small	business	is	the	basis	for	surviving.	
But	major	services	necessary	for	overall	economic	
recovery	like	telecommunications,	logistics	and	
banking	etc.	are	too	complex	for	small	and	local	
business	to	master.	Although	local	companies	usu-
ally	manage	to	survive	despite	the	risks	and	chal-
lenges	in	their	uncertain	environment,	they	lack	
access	to	resources,	necessary	financial	means	and	
very	often	also	the	entrepreneurial	spirit	necessary	
for	major	business	operations.	The	need	for	major	
investments	and	large-scale	operations	necessitates	
business	activities	from	abroad	or	outside	the	
region	which	often	come	into	conflict	with	local	
competitors	and	more	importantly	with	political	
ramifications	which	render	business	activities	
extremely	risky.	
DGAPanalyse 4 | December 2010
10
The Importance of the Private Sector
The	impact	of 	conflicts	on	entrepreneurial	activi-
ties	has	meanwhile	become	the	subject	of 	a	wider	
literature.	Research	results	presented	so	far	imply	that	
“entrepreneurship	plays	an	important	role	in	driv-
ing	countries	out	of 	poverty	traps,	and	even	out	of 	
conflict	situations.	Part	of 	the	literature	also	stresses	
that,	rather	than	entrepreneurship	per	se,	it	is	produc-
tive	entrepreneurship	that	nurtures	development.	On	
the	other	hand,	conflict	is	likely	to	have	an	impact,	
directly	or	indirectly,	both	on	the	possibility	of 	hold-
ing	an	entrepreneurial	activity,	and	on	the	motivations	
to	do	so	(whether	for	survival	or	because	of 	the	
exploitation	of 	new	business	opportunities).”7
Based	on	these	insights	the	core	message	of 	this	pro-
posal	suggests	that	business	activities	are	key	to	suc-
cess	in	stabilizing	disputed	regions	and	failing	states:	
For	millions	of 	people,	basic	services	helping	them	to	
organize	their	most	urgent	daily	needs	are	not	being	
provided	by	functioning	states	and	state	services	but	
by	private	companies	both	domestic	and	international.
Without	such	business	activities	aimed	at	improving	
infrastructure,	providing	communication	services,	
organizing	basic	logistic	needs	or	allowing	for	finan-
cial	transactions,	life	in	these	regions	would	be	even	
more	complicated	because	states	or	competing	state-
like	institutions	are	not	able	or	willing	to	provide	
these	services.	Without	business	helping	out,	any	
debate	about	Human	Rights,	living	standards	or	the	
improvement	of 	people’s	livelihood	remains	sym-
bolic,	out	of 	touch	with	reality	and	open	for	double	
standards.
But	doing	business	in	disputed	regions	is	of 	course	
burdened	with	enormous	risks.	By	definition,	con-
tested	statehood	does	not	provide	the	reliability	of 	
legal	rules	which	allow	for	the	safety	of 	long-term	
investment,	the	return	of 	interest	on	invested	capital	
or	even	the	safety	of 	operations	on	the	ground.	In	
theory,	the	most	obvious	advice	to	any	company	
could,	therefore,	only	be:	Never	invest	in	disputed	
regions!	Risks	are	too	high,	investments	not	safe	
enough	and	return	on	investment	mostly	a	fragile	
expectation.	In	addition,	there	is	an	image	risk	for	
being	accused	(mostly	by	media)	of 	too	close	rela-
tions	with	dictatorial	leaderships,	in-transparent	politi-
cal	structures,	illegitimate	institutions	or,	even	worse,	
with	politicians	and	institutions	violating	Human	
Rights.
From	a	business	perspective,	disputed	regions	are	
without	exception	small	and	risky	markets.	Turnover	
and	(if 	existing)	return	on	investment	does	not	have	
any	significant	impact	on	a	company’s	overall	bal-
ance	sheet.	Quite	to	the	contrary:	A	typical	worst	
case	scenario	is	an	investment	coming	under	political	
pressure,	thus	at	the	same	time	doing	maximum	dam-
age	not	only	to	the	investment	itself 	but	also	to	the	
company’s	image	at	home	and	abroad	including	the	
danger	of 	serious	financial	losses	(on	third	and	major	
markets).
Where	then	does	the	motivation	for	investing	in	
disputed	regions	come	from?	Based	on	confidential	
interviews	with	business	representatives	of 	compa-
nies	active	in	these	regions,	the	following	four	sets	of 	
motives	are	decisive:
First,	an	interest	in	continuation	of 	business	is	pre-
venting	retreat	from	disputed	regions.	In	some	cases,	
companies	especially	in	the	infrastructure	and	logis-
tics	field	had	started	business	operations	before	the	
outbreak	of 	political	conflicts	over	sovereignty.	They	
then	tend	to	continue	their	activities	despite	growing	
insecurity	by	managing	to	adapt	to	a	radically	changed	
environment	in	order	to	protect	former	invest-
ments	and	maintain	relations	with	local	partners	and	
customers.
Second,	future	market	expectations	may	play	a	role	in	
investment	decisions.	Although	most	disputed	regions	
have	comparatively	small	local	markets	and	contribute	
little	to	the	overall	income	of 	global	players,	expecta-
tions	in	the	market	development	after	a	solution	of 	
political	problems	are	given	as	a	reason	for	engaging	
in	these	regions.
Third,	comprehensive	service	offer	for	customers	
seems	to	be	the	dominating	motive	for	most	com-
panies	who	want	to	serve	their	customer	interests	by	
providing	services	even	in	those	regions	where	for	
political	and	economic	reasons	they	would	otherwise	
not	be	operating.	Consequently,	they	face	additional	
costs	in	order	to	manage	especially	security	but	also	
general	market	risks.
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Finally,	although	this	motive	is	never	officially	given,	
political	interests	may	play	a	role	–	rendering	the	pri-
vate	sector	a	substitute	for	exerting	political	influence	
in	a	region	which	would	otherwise	not	be	accessible	
for	direct	influence	of 	external	political	actors.	In	
disputed	regions,	clear	dividing	lines	between	busi-
ness	and	state	sectors	are	often	difficult	to	define.	In	
a	positive	perspective,	foreign	companies	may	be	
forced	to	take	over	the	role	of 	rule-setters	them-
selves	in	economic	environments	where	rules	are	
almost	non-existing	and	certainly	unreliable.	Typical	
examples	are	companies	which	have	to	hire	private	
security	personal,	thus	taking	over	at	least	partially	
state	functions	–	and	are	welcomed	and	supported	
by	NGOs	in	that	specific	function.	A	Study	on	“Sus-
tainability	in	Petroleum	Industry”	clearly	reflects	this	
problem	and	widens	the	task	for	corporate	actors	by	
openly	stating:	“Faced	with	serious	deficiencies	in	the	
institutional	framework	of 	global	markets,	companies	
can	no	longer	restrict	themselves	to	the	role	of 	rule-
taking.	Instead,	companies	must	actively	participate	
in	processes	of 	rule-making.	In	order	to	live	up	to	
expectations,	it	is	not	enough	to	comply	with	a	given	
set	of 	(deficient)	rules.	What	is	legal	is	not	always	
accepted	to	be	legitimate.	Therefore,	companies	are	
well	advised	to	engage	in	New	Governance.	They	
undertake	ordo-responsibility	and	participate	as	cor-
porate	citizens	in	rule-finding	discourses	as	well	as	
in	rule-setting	political	processes.”8	But	in	a	negative	
perspective,	a	company	could	also	become	viewed	
as	a	representative	and	perhaps	even	a	substitute	for	
an	external	political	actor	(i.e.	a	state)	involved	in	
the	conflict.	In	that	case,	negative	consequences	for	
global	positioning	and	corporate	credibility	might	
follow.	
As	a	consequence	of 	this	last	aspect,	it	is	first	of 	all	
important	to	understand	that	there	are	two	com-
pletely	unequal	rationales	for	any	kind	of 	engagement	
in	disputed	regions.	Most	political	initiatives	are	either	
based	on	rules	and	norms	(e.g.	“good	governance”)	
and	aim	at	fundamental	changes	in	the	systemic	
setup	of 	institutions,	decision-making	procedures,	
selection	of 	leadership	personnel	and	political	norms	
applied	in	the	target	area,	or	driven	by	power	politics	
and	specific	intentions	of 	external	state	institutions.
Business	engagement,	however,	is	driven	by	a	broad	
spectrum	of 	interests,	as	we	have	seen.	These	inter-
ests	reflect	changes	in	regional	engagement	after	
political	conditions	have	changed	on	the	ground,	
including	the	flexibility	for	partial	retreat	or	even	a	
radical	shut-down	of 	operations	when	conditions	
become	too	severe	to	further	pursue	former	eco-
nomic	interests.
In	a	purely	business	perspective,	markets	in	disputed	
regions	are	too	risky	and	too	small	to	allow	for	an	
economic	engagement	without	political	impetus	or	
support.	And	even	more	importantly,	what	does	
matter	for	business	is	stability	–	no	matter	who	is	
the	institution	or	person	guaranteeing	it.	It	may	be	a	
democratic	state,	it	may	be	an	autocratic	state,	it	may	
even	be	a	dictatorial	system.	As	long	as	stability	pre-
vails	which	allows	for	reliable	conditions	of 	engage-
ment,	politics	is	almost	by	definition	not	the	first	and	
foremost	interest	of 	companies,	but	their	respective	
economic	interest.	
Implementing	“change	via	trade”	will,	therefore,	only	
work	when	it	is	possible	to	base	business	engagement	
on	a	long-term	perspective	and	on	the	unconditional	
will	of 	companies	to	implement	their	own	social	
standards	(e.g.	along	the	principles	of 	“global	com-
pact”)	no	matter	what	local	conditions	are.	Here	lies	
the	secret	of 	very	indirect,	rarely	publicly	debated	
but	still	highly	efficient	piecemeal	changes	in	busi-
ness	culture	which	might	not	only	help	workers	and	
employees	who	are	directly	affected	but	might	also	
win	a	more	substantial	effect	on	political	changes	
outside	the	immediate	sphere	of 	business	influence.
Thus,	apart	from	states	as	agents	of 	good	gover-
nance,	there	are	also	increasing	expectations	on	busi-
ness	to	help	promote	good	governance:	Business	and	
business	associations	“have	a	duty	to	respect	ethical	
considerations,	which	may	be	a	written	code	of 	con-
duct	or	much	harder	to	define,	as	ethics	can	depend	
on	the	view	taken	by	the	outside	world	of 	the	behav-
iour	of 	the	organization.”9
However,	high-flying	intentions	to	implement	good	
governance	both	for	states	and	companies	are	not	
enough.	There	is	always	the	risk	of 	failure,	but	
even	more	so	the	risk	of 	a	potential	loss	of 	image	
by	national	and	international	campaigns	criticizing	
approaches	and	results	in	target	areas.
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Business Risks in Disputed Regions
In	addition	to	the	motives	and	political	ramifications	
for	business	in	disputed	regions,	there	are	a	number	
of 	core	risks	which	have	a	definite	impact	on	activi-
ties	on	the	ground.	Based	on	interviews	with	business	
representatives	from	different	sectors,	four	of 	these	
risks	have	proved	as	especially	important.
First,	seeking	legal	reliability	is	a	major	challenge	for	
all	private	sector	activities	in	areas	where	almost	by	
definition	legal	frameworks	are	weak	or	even	non-
existing.	But	it	is	not	only	the	formal	aspect	of 	legal	
frameworks	for	business	activities,	but	also	the	need	
for	companies	to	protect	their	own	people	from	legal	
prosecution	within	disputed	regions,	but	similarly	
important	also	from	international	prosecution	in	
case	contenders	for	state	power	turn	to	foreign	law-
enforcement	agencies	(like	e.g.	Interpol).	Sometimes	
company	representatives	complain	that	it	is	easier	for	
local	authorities	to	prosecute	officials	from	foreign	
companies	than	to	undertake	administrative	or	legal	
steps	to	do	so	themselves	(or	create	reliable	legal	
structures	for	that	matter).
Second,	in	a	broader	perspective,	managing	security	
is	a	fundamental	risk	both	related	to	products	which	
might	be	stolen	and	misused	and	certainly	also	to	per-
sonal	working	on	the	ground	who	might	be	endan-
gered	by	criminal	activities	such	as	robbery,	blackmail	
or	in	worst	cases	even	kidnapping.	There	can	never	
be	a	guarantee	that	products	and	services	meant	to	
improve	living	standards	might	also	be	misused	to	
serve	the	respective	interests	of 	local	power-hold-
ers.	E.g.	providing	telecommunication	facilities	could,	
of 	course,	be	a	requisite	to	improve	civil	society’s	
activities,	but	it	might	also	be	used	to	spot	dissidents,	
arrest	them	and	put	them	into	jail	–	with	obvious	
consequences	of 	violation	of 	Human	Rights,	failing	
standards	of 	rule	of 	law	and	international	criticism	
also	affecting	the	original	provider	of 	the	technologi-
cal	capacities	needed	for	such	a	policy.
Third,	transferring	Corporate	Governance	(and	com-
pliance)	is	politically	desirable,	necessary	for	creating	
public	legitimacy,	but	almost	certainly	also	open	for	
problems	of 	implementation	on	the	ground.	Bribery	
and	corruption	certainly	belong	to	the	most	impor-
tant	challenges	in	this	respect,	especially	since	legal	
frameworks	are	weak	or	disputed	and	specific	actions	
difficult	to	prosecute.	In	more	general	words,	non-
compliance	may	be	found	by	different	sets	of 	actors	
who	work	in	violation	of 	a	company’s	rules	and	are	
difficult	to	spot,	to	force	into	compliance	or	to	push	
out	of 	business	due	to	their	misbehaviour.	Whatever	
the	difficulties	are	in	detail,	the	final	consequences	
will	always	affect	not	only	those	who	violate	rules,	but	
also	the	foreign	company	which	officially	stands	for	
their	implementation.	Again	there	is	almost	no	way	
of 	generalizing	on	this	issue	since	local	circumstances,	
the	actors	involved	and	the	seriousness	of 	conse-
quences	stemming	from	non-compliance	are	too	spe-
cific	to	choose	an	overall	strategic	approach	to	solve	
the	problem.	Every	foreign	company	will	have	to	find	
specific	ways	to	deal	with	these	issues	on	an	almost	
case	by	case	approach.
Finally,	promoting	Human	Rights	always	is	a	politi-
cally	most	sensitive	issue	with	potential	repercussions	
on	image	and	public	standing.	Human	Rights	rank	
prominently	in	the	foreign	policies	of 	almost	all	west-
ern	states.	Insisting	on	standards	of 	Human	Rights	
being	implemented	in	countries	with	which	western	
democracies	have	political	and	economic	relations	has	
traditionally	become	a	standard	procedure	within	for-
eign	policy	debates.	It	is,	however,	necessary	to	realize	
the	threat	of 	double	standards:	Whenever	economic	
interests	have	to	be	balanced	against	Human	Rights	
positions,	the	very	idea	of 	Human	Rights	might	suf-
fer	more	damage	than	anticipated	by	its	proponents.	
For	the	time	being,	the	public	discourse	in	western	
democracies	finds	it	difficult	to	accept	a	very	simple	
distinction	which	would	help	solve	the	double	stan-
dard	problem	and	would	allow	for	a	integrated	and	
thus	more	flexible	and	credible	Human	Rights	policy.	
On	the	government	level,	Human	Rights	of 	course	
will	have	to	remain	on	the	agenda.	The	debates	with	
other	governments,	however,	could	and	should	be	
reduced	to	the	instruments	of 	silent	diplomacy	which	
in	the	end	might	be	more	successful	between	govern-
ments	than	any	attempt	to	publicly	blame	and	shame	
partners	for	violations	of 	Human	Rights.	The	usual	
consequence	of 	such	debates	leads	to	unsolvable	
controversies	and	hardly	to	the	intended	effects.	On	
the	second	level,	however,	when	NGOs	come	into	
play,	it	is	necessary	for	any	NGO	working	in	this	
field,	to	be	as	outspoken	as	possible.	Institutions	like	
Amnesty	International	may	not	be	silent	as	long	as	
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Human	Rights	are	being	violated	anywhere	in	the	
world.	It	is	their	task	to	publicly	address	any	form	of 	
violations	of 	Human	Rights	thereby	complimenting	
(and	not	contradicting)	government	policies	of 	silent	
diplomacy.	And	in	addition	there	is	the	third	element	
of 	economic	cooperation	which	is	not	by	definition	
an	obstacle	to	active	Human	Rights	policies.	Even	
companies	who	are	active	in	areas	and	states	where	
Human	Rights	are	being	violated,	do	have	to	follow	
their	primary	mission	of 	doing	business	(i.e.	mak-
ing	money),	but	by	providing	necessary	services	for	
improving	welfare	and	improving	livelihood	and	more	
importantly	by	setting	standards	concerning	labor	
law	and	the	treatment	of 	workers	they	might	help	to	
implement	Human	Rights	much	more	effectively	than	
by	simply	following	heroic	demands	for	not	doing	
business	with	countries	and	regions	in	which	Human	
Rights	are	not	(yet)	implemented	according	to	western	
standards.
Any	successful	Human	Rights	policy	should	thus	be	
legitimately	divided	into	three	sub-approaches:	First,	
predominantly	silent	government	policies;	second,	
open	and	critical	NGO	approaches,	and	third	prag-
matic	support	of 	stabilization	measures	focusing	on	
the	provision	of 	basic	services,	including	social	stan-
dards	offered	by	business.	It	is	the	complementarity	
between	these	approaches	which	holds	the	key	to	suc-
cess	and	not	mutually	exclusive	accusations	mainly	in	
western	media!
The	preliminary	findings	we	have	presented	so	far,	
lead	to	two	core	messages:	First,	it	is	counterproduc-
tive	to	force	foreign	companies	into	retreat	from	
disputed	regions	and	failing	states	(mostly	via	sanc-
tions	and	threats	to	market	shares	in	strategic	more	
important	and	bigger	markets).	Almost	as	a	rule,	other	
actors	(most	prominently,	but	not	only	from	China)	
easily	move	in,	take	over	markets	shares	and	start	
implementing	their	own	strategic	interests	–	including	
the	implementation	of 	much	lower	standards	of 	CSR	
and	social	responsibility	than	would	have	otherwise	
been	implemented.	In	this	respect,	political	pressure	is	
clearly	counterproductive	to	political	symbolism	and	
value	oriented	political	aims!	And	secondly,	any	com-
pany	which	wants	to	be	successful	in	these	markets	is	
well	advised	to	reach	respectively	maintain	maximum	
public	support	by	actively	and	unconditionally	imple-
menting	global	standards	of 	CSR	and	to	communi-
cate	this	policy	with	as	much	transparency	as	possible	
both	on	home	and	target	markets	in	order	to	protect	
itself 	against	incalculable	public	criticism.
All	these	risks	do	in	principle	apply	to	any	foreign	
business	active	in	disputed	regions.	But	there	are	busi-
ness	fields	which	due	to	their	utmost	importance	for	
the	provision	of 	basic	services	clearly	are	strategically	
more	important	than	others.	
Strategic Business Fields
Building	infrastructure	belongs	to	the	most	basic	
and	important	needs	in	all	regions	where	necessary	
investments	are	scarce,	existing	structures	often	non-
functioning	or	at	least	partly	destroyed	and	millions	
of 	people	dependant	on	help	from	abroad	to	support	
their	most	basic	needs	for	survival.	
The	importance	of 	providing	such	basic	services	in	
vital	areas	of 	business	and	health	care	can	be	under-
scored	by	two	examples	from	Kosovo:
“Frequent	power	cuts	hamper	industrial	production	
and	people’s	everyday	life	in	Kosovo.	The	need	to	
import	electricity	from	abroad	comes	at	a	significant	
cost	for	business.	Moreover,	most	health	centres	still	
need	to	rely	on	generators	to	ensure	their	electric-
ity	supply.	On	12	January	2009,	an	explosion	in	the	
Rahovec/Orahovac	health	centre’s	generator	triggered	
a	dangerous	situation	in	which	the	200	patients	of 	
the	hospital	were	temporarily	left	without	electric-
ity.	When	the	generator	caught	fire,	the	centre	was	
taking	care	of 	four	women	who	were	about	to	give	
birth,	several	patients	with	injuries	and	a	number	of 	
others	who	needed	regular	medical	treatment	for	flu,	
stomach	problems	or	other	illnesses.	Crucial	medical	
equipment	such	as	X-ray	machines	and	the	refrigera-
tor	storing	vaccines	stopped	working.	According	to	
Dr.	Vuqiterna,	the	situation	triggered	a	panic	since	the	
hospital	personnel	could	not	be	sure	whether	the	gen-
erator	could	be	fixed	and	how	many	emergency	cases	
might	have	to	be	seen	to	in	the	meantime.	Although	
the	OSCE	donated	their	generator	to	the	health	
centre,	this	is	not	a	durable	solution.	However,	the	
municipality	cannot	provide	the	funding	to	improve	
the	town’s	power	infrastructure.”10
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A	second	example	underlines	the	severity	of 	the	prob-
lem	since	it	demonstrates	that	local	suppliers	are	all	
but	reliable	–	adding	to	the	anyway	high	risks	of 	local	
business:
“In	the	‘Dona’	fruit	juice	factory	in	Podujeve,	North-
east	Kosovo,	there	are	two	big	generators	which	buzz	
without	stopping.	Due	to	the	immense	noise	that	they	
make,	facial	expressions	seem	to	be	the	only	way	of 	
communication	for	the	workers,	since	words	can’t	be	
heard.	Bashkim	Osmani,	the	owner	of 	the	factory,	
says	that	there	is	no	other	way	out,	except	the	usage	
of 	these	noisy	equipments	which	have	cost	him	about	
90.000 €. This happened when he made the decision 
to	withdraw	from	the	official	electricity	distribution	
system	of 	the	national	energy	company,	KEK,	since	
he	could	no	longer	bare	the	power	shortages.	‘If 	you	
rely	on	KEK,	then	your	business	is	over,’	he	says.”11
The	lesson	is	clear:	People	depend	on	sustained	sup-
port	of 	energy	production	and	supply	by	foreign	
companies	if 	they	want	to	maintain	their	daily	life	and	
business.
A	second	and	similarly	important	service	refers	to	tele-
communications.	“The	mobile	telecommunications	
sector	is	unique	in	that	airwaves	can	travel	without	
regard	to	borders,	often	defying	the	licensing	and	
regulation	practices	of 	one	side	of 	a	territorial	dispute.	
Even	if 	a	mobile	company	is	operating	legally	in	one	
region,	it	cannot	necessarily	control	whether	its	air-
waves	traverse	the	border	into	another	region.	It	also	
provides	plausible	deniability	to	mobile	companies	
who	can	claim	(whether	rightly	or	not)	that	they	are	
not	operating	in	a	disputed	territory.”	12
A	comparative	press	survey	between	February	and	
October	2010	easily	reveals	the	ubiquity	of 	typical	
problems	in	almost	all	disputed	regions:	“Disputes	
in	Kosovo,	the	Palestinian	Territories,	South	Ossetia	
and	Abkhazia	have	garnered	the	most	media	attention	
in	the	past	months.	Questions	persist	over	Russian	
investment	and	property	rights	in	the	territories	of 	
South	Ossetia	and	Abkhasia,	a	region	where	refugees	
have	not	been	repatriated.	The	privatization	offering	
of 	Kosovo’s	telecommunications	company	PTK	to	
European	investors	raises	questions	about	the	owner-
ship	of 	assets	in	the	region	claimed	as	integral	terri-
tory	of 	Serbia.	The	entry	of 	Qatari	mobile	provider	
Wataniya	into	the	Palestinian	market	highlights	the	
problem	of 	bandwidth	licensing	in	a	state	with	limited	
recognition.	In	addition	to	these	examples,	interna-
tional	companies	face	a	similar	business	climate	in	the	
unrecognized	states	of 	Western	Sahara,	Transnistria,	
Nagorno-Karabakh	and	Northern	Cyprus.”13
Providing	functioning	banking	services	is	of 	spe-
cial	relevance	to	all	those	people	who	have	relatives	
abroad	who	are	able	and	willing	to	support	them	by	
transferring	money	via	international	banks	to	local	
accounts.	Hampering	these	services	immediately	has	
severe	consequences	for	local	business	and	individual	
families.	A	prominent	example	is	related	to	American	
authorities’	closing	down	of 	international	activities	
of 	the	Somalian	Barakaat	Bank	which	was	suspected	
of 	having	financially	supported	terrorist	activities	in	
Somalia.	The	Bank,	Somalia’s	biggest	employer	also	
holds	a	telecommunication	company,	a	construction	
company	and	a	number	of 	other	businesses.	When	12	
million	US	Dollar	were	frozen,	thousands	of 	Somalis	
living	in	exile	lost	their	opportunity	to	transfer	money	
to	their	relatives	who	in	most	cases	directly	depend	
on	these	incomes	for	their	daily	survival.	In	addition,	
5,000	employees	of 	the	bank	lost	their	jobs.14
Finally,	logistics	plays	an	important	and	strategic	
role	in	providing	reliable	channels	of 	transport	for	
both	export	and	import	of 	products	and	sensitive	
resources.	Transport	security,	but	also	the	protection	
of 	local	agents	ranks	prominently	in	most	companies	
business	activities.	Based	on	the	motive	of 	compre-
hensive	service,	bases	of 	operation	are	only	rarely	to	
be	found	within	disputed	regions.	Instead,	transport	
channels	are	organized	from	the	immediate	neigh-
bouring	areas	to	reduce	the	risk	of 	local	insecurity.	
Business	strategies	might	vary	considerably	from	
region	to	region,	but	usually	concentrate	on	transport	
logistics	only.	Market	size	as	well	as	political	and	pub-
lic	security	risks	prevent	the	implementation	of 	the	
whole	chain	of 	logistics	activities.	But	still,	the	service	
provided	by	global	logistic	companies	is	without	alter-
native	to	support	at	least	a	minimum	of 	connectivity	
with	the	outside	world.
In	all	these	fields,	two	strategic	aspects	are	essential	
for	success.	First,	the	need	for	political	coordination	
is	without	alternative.	While	external	political	support	
usually	remains	on	the	symbolic	level	only,	business	
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activities	without	external	political	support	may	run	
into	a	trap	of 	helping	to	stabilize	structures	in	which	
those	actors	prevail	whose	interest	in	really	reshaping	
public	order	is	lowest,	while	no	support	might	lead	to	
unacceptable	living	conditions	and	a	further	decay	of 	
state	functions.	Thus,	political	insurance	and	support	
for	risky	business	investments	in	disputed	regions	is	
essential	for	success	and	in	the	mutual	interest	of 	all	
external	actors	involved.
But	secondly,	learning	from	general	lessons	of 	busi-
ness	in	underdeveloped	regions	provides	useful	ele-
ments	of 	a	strategy	of 	self-immunization	against	both	
public	criticism	and	even	legal	prosecution.	As	Ann	
Bernstein,	the	Executive	Director	of 	the	Centre	for	
Development	and	Enterprise	in	South	Africa	explains:	
“Companies	are	frequently	painted	as	social	outlaws	
which	fundamentally	need	to	change	their	ways	
before	they	can	play	a	positive	role	in	the	developing	
world	–	if 	at	all,	ever.	And	yet	rather	than	provoking	
a	vigorous	reaction	from	business,	especially	those	
many	large	companies	with	huge	interests	and	inno-
vative	and	detailed	strategies	in	the	developing	world,	
this	determined	attack	has	for	the	most	part	met	a	
limp	response,	reactive	only	to	the	most	serious	public	
challenges.”15	For	business,	it	is	always	a	challenge	to	
cross	borders	into	the	field	of 	politics.	For	business	
in	disputed	regions	there	is,	however,	no	alternative	
to	doing	exactly	that:	Realize	the	political	aspects	of 	
business	activities,	promote	them	in	as	much	transpar-
ency	as	possible	and	actively	defend	them	against	a	
critical	international	public	opinion.	
Conclusions
Debates	about	economic	activities	in	disputed	regions	
–	if 	they	take	place	at	all	–	are	driven	by	prejudices,	
pre-perceived	views	and	a	normative	overkill.	In	clear	
contrast	to	this	debate,	the	present	study	concludes	
that	doing	business	in	disputed	regions	does	contrib-
ute	to	improved	infrastructure,	provides	necessary	
services	and	helps	raise	people’s	living	standards.	
Without	these	economic	activities,	the	overall	situation	
on	the	ground	would	be	much	worse	–	irrespective	
of 	specific	local,	historical,	cultural	and	political	condi-
tions.	The	business	dimension	should	be	much	more	
actively	integrated	into	strategic	debates	of 	state	build-
ing	and	supporting	failing	or	failed	states	in	(re-)build-
ing	their	institutions	and	implementing	necessary	
standards	of 	governance.
Based	on	the	logic	of 	this	proposal,	there	are	five	stra-
tegic	ingredients	to	success	for	companies	willing	to	
do	business	in	disputed	regions:
1.	 First,	do	business	and	not	politics	and	try	to	stay	
out	of 	the	political	conflict	whenever	and	as	long	
as	possible.	In	those	cases	where	business	provides	
state	functions,	one	should	refrain	from	generali-
zations.	Best	case	scenarios	are,	of 	course,	always	
possible.	But	the	permanent	risk	of 	helping	to	
stabilize	corrupt	and	incompetent	regimes	inclu-
ding	the	risk	of 	creating	negative	effects	for	many,	
and	positive	effects	for	only	a	few	should	always	
be	high	on	the	watch	list	of 	responsible	business	
leaders.
2.	 Implement	a	transparent	code	of 	conduct,	make	
sure	that	implementation	works	properly	and	be	
unwavering	on	promoting	globally	accepted	stan-
dards	of 	business	behavior.	Due	to	the	lack	of 	a	
doubtful	character	of 	regulatory	or	law	enforce-
ment	agencies,	it	is	a	company’s	own	responsi-
bility	to	not	only	protect	its	business	operations	
at	whatever	cost,	but	also	its	corporate	image	of 	
doing	clean	and	legitimate	business.
3.	 Seek	support	on	the	one	hand	from	reliable	local	
partners	and	base	your	activities	on	personal	and	
institutional	trust,	but	on	the	other	hand	also	from	
non-involved	global	actors	and	institutions	since	
they	can	be	of 	enormous	help	for	image	building	
both	abroad	and	in	the	target	area.	Seeking	such	
political	support	is	a	necessary	requisite	for	success	
–	both	at	home	and	in	the	target	areas.	
4.	 Whenever	possible,	join	international	regulatory	
systems,	choose	not	only	a	local,	but	a	regional	
approach	and	cooperate	with	other	companies	
(including	competitors)	to	coordinate	the	imp-
lementation	of 	compliance.	Single	action	might	
be	countered	or	circumvented	by	local	actors.	
Coordinated	efforts	help	to	improve	the	business	
environment.	A	lack	of 	international	support	may	
not	only	endanger	business	success,	but	also	have	
a	negative	impact	on	humanitarian	standards.
5.	 Seek	a	pro-active,	transparent	communication	
strategy	and	thus	create	public	understanding	
and	international	backing	for	local	and	regional	
business	activities.	It	is	imperative	for	companies	
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to	choose	a	pro-active	communication	strategy	
promoting	their	activities	not	only	within	disputed	
regions	where	they	are	active,	but	even	more	
importantly	on	their	home	markets.	Actively	
managing	potential	public	criticism	from	media	
and	NGOs	is	key	to	success.	In	a	business	per-
spective,	the	topic	is	radioactive.	There	is	no	busi-
ness	representative	who	would	not	be	concerned	
about	being	criticized	in	western	media	for	doing	
business,	i.e.	making	money,	with	corrupt	dictators,	
undemocratic	leaders	or	illegitimate	institutions	
(always	based	on	a	western	perception	of 	demo-
cracy	and	how	it	should	work).	Thus,	an	“infor-
med	understanding	of 	the	realities	as	they	truly	
are	will	provide	business	the	confidence	to	stop	
apologizing,	develop	its	own	public	agenda	and	
promote	the	phenomenal	benefits	of 	competitive	
capitalism		for	the	less	developed	countries	of 	the	
world”	(Ann	Bernstein),	a	lesson	which	clearly	also	
applies	to	business	in	disputed	regions.	
Finally,	let	us	come	back	to	the	core	thesis	of 	this	
paper:	Business	activities	are	fundamentally	important	
to	help	stabilize	some	of 	the	most	sensitive	regions	of 	
today’s	world.	But,	of 	course,	not	all	business	is	per	
se	good	business.	But	those	companies	which	follow	
the	rules	and	suggestions	described	above	deserve	
political	and	public	support	including	the	protection	
of 	their	people	on	the	ground	and	provisions	against	
doubtful	legal	prosecution.	
For	the	international	community,	the	core	conclusion	
refers	to	the	definite	need	for	providing	a	new,	more	
pragmatic	and	efficiency-oriented	approach	to	the	
propagation	of 	“good	governance”	and	western	val-
ues	(including	Human	Rights).	We	have	seen	that	in	
addition	to	purely	economic	aspects,	business	activi-
ties	do	provide	carriers	for	a	potentially	successful	
diffusion	strategy.	It	is	exactly	here	that	business	and	
politics	will	have	to	improve	coordinated	approaches	
towards	sensitive	regions.	Such	coordination	first	and	
foremost	must	be	based	on	the	provision	of 	legal	
support	in	a	broad	spectrum	of 	risks	(ranging	from	
protection	of 	individuals,	to	the	implementation	of 	
legal	procedures	and	to	the	advancement	of 	inter-
national	systems	of 	regulations	especially	in	those	
regions	where	rules	almost	by	definition	do	not	exist).	
Political	actors	who	want	to	help	stabilize	certain	dis-
puted	regions	are	well	advised	to	integrate	business	
perspectives	into	their	strategic	planning	and	to	coor-
dinate	external	influence	by	recognizing	the	demand	
for	reliable	legal	frameworks	as	a	requisite	for	any	suc-
cessful	business	as	well	as	political	strategy.
Prof . Dr . Eberhard Sandschneider is Otto Wolff-
Director of the Research Institute, DGAP e .V .
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